File n° 43 

The Fifth French Republic set up a hybrid political regime with characteristics of both a presidential regime, such as the election of the president by direct, universal suffrage and of a parliamentary regime, notably the possibility for the National Assembly to hold the Government to account.

Article 20 of the 1958 French Constitution provides that the Government “shall answer to Parliament in accordance with the terms and procedures set out in articles 49 and 50”. These terms and procedures reflect the desire of the framers to bring together two ideas often seen as opposed: governmental accountability and governmental stability.

Article 50 limits the power of censure solely to the National Assembly: “When the National Assembly carries a motion of censure, or when it fails to endorse the programme of the Government or a statement of general policy of the Government, the Prime Minister must tender the resignation of the Government to the President of the Republic”. Such cases are the only ones requiring the Prime Minister to tender the resignation of his Government.

Article 49 of the French Constitution lays down three procedures for making Government accountability an issue of confidence before the National Assembly. This article also provides in its last paragraph for a procedure of approval of a statement of general policy by the Senate. A negative vote in this case would not lead to the resignation of the Government.

I. –  ARTICLE 49, PARAGRAPH 1: MAKING THE GOVERNMENT’S PROGRAMME
OR A STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY AN ISSUE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT

1. – Procedure

This procedure is initiated by the Government and must be discussed in the Council of Ministers.

The Prime Minister alone may make the Government’s programme or a statement of general policy an issue of confidence in the Government before the National Assembly.

The Conference of Presidents organizes the debates (it decides upon the overall time allotted to each political group, with each group having, regardless of its size, unless the Conference decides otherwise, thirty minutes for its main speaker). The debate is usually followed by a general statement explaining their vote by designated speakers.

An absolute majority of votes cast is required. The vote is by public ballot at the rostrum or in the rooms adjoining the Chamber. This latter solution is often applied to speed up the voting process.

2. – Practice

At the beginning of the Fifth Republic, the first governments, in an attempt to show that they held their legitimacy solely from the fact of having been appointed by the President of the Republic, did not systematically seek the confidence of the National Assembly upon taking office. This was to display that the Government was no longer appointed by the Assembly. Furthermore, during the IX^th Parliament of the Fifth Republic (1988-1993), the absence of an absolute majority in the Assembly prevented three successive governments (those of Michel Rocard, Edith Cresson and Pierre Bérégovoy) from seeking confidence votes on their programmes before the National Assembly. However, since 1993, every government has sought the confidence of the National Assembly within a few days of its appointment.

In addition, some governments have, in their lifetime, often at the time of a specific event, sought the confidence of the National Assembly. Since 1958, article 49, paragraph 1, has been used 31 times.

II. – ARTICLE 49, PARAGRAPH 2 : THE TABLING OF A MOTION
OF CENSURE INITIATED BY MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

1. – Procedure

Members of Parliament may table a motion of censure through the President of the National Assembly. To be admissible, such a motion must be signed by at least one tenth of the members of the Assembly (i.e. 58 members when all constituencies are represented). Nonetheless, in order to avoid the over-use of such motions, each member may only sign such a motion three times during a single ordinary session and once during a single extraordinary session (the motions of censure following the making of a bill an issue of confidence in the Government, in accordance with article 49, paragraph 3 of the Constitution, are not included in this count). After the tabling of the motion, no signature may be added or removed. The names of signatories are listed in the verbatim minutes of the debates published in the Journal Officiel.

The discussion preceding the motion of censure is organized in exactly the same way as the debate preceding the motion of confidence.

Rationalized parliamentarianism, with its desire to provide governmental stability has inspired two mechanisms:

―    The tabling of a motion of censure leads to a 48-hour period during which no vote on the motion may be taken so as to avoid the possibility of votes being cast too impetuously. The Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly also stipulate the maximal time limit. They provide the Conference of Presidents with the task of fixing the timetable of the debate which must take place before the third day of sitting following the end of the limit set down by the Constitution. Governmental priority concerning the agenda can not thus be used to delay the discussion of a motion of censure.

―    Only the members in favour of the motion of censure take part in the vote (which is held at the rostrum or in the adjoining rooms to the Chamber and which is open for 45 minutes). The motion is only carried if it is supported by the absolute majority of the members of the National Assembly.

2. – Practice

Only one motion of censure has ever been passed and that was in 1962. This motion was aimed at showing the National Assembly’s hostility less towards the Government and more towards the plan of General de Gaulle, the then President, to have the Constitution modified by referendum and have the head of state elected by direct, universal suffrage. The General replied to the censure of the Government by announcing the dissolution of the National Assembly. The subsequent general election returned a majority to the Assembly in favour of the General’s policy.

The majority phenomenon has substantially reduced the impact of the motion of censure. Nowadays it is mainly used as a procedural weapon allowing the opposition to prompt a formal debate which interrupts the agenda set down by the Government.

III. – ARTICLE 49, PARAGRAPH 3 : MAKING THE ADOPTION OF A BILL
AN ISSUE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT

1. – Procedure

Making Government accountability an issue of confidence can be the result of the combination of two initiatives: that of the Prime Minister to seek this confidence before the Assembly over the adoption of a bill in discussion in the Assembly, followed by that of the M.P.s who reply by tabling a motion of censure.

For the provisions of article 49, paragraph 3 of the Constitution to be implemented prior debate in the Council of Ministers is required.

The Prime Minister’s decision brings about the immediate suspension, for twenty-four hours, of discussion on the bill concerning which confidence has been sought. If no motion of censure is tabled during this period (or if the motion is subsequently defeated) the bill is considered to be passed. Any motion of censure is debated and voted upon in the same conditions as those applying to motions submitted “spontaneously” by members.

This procedure which enables the passing of a bill without a vote being taken on the text itself can be seen as the ultimate step in rationalized parliamentarianism. The logic is the following: if the National Assembly - hence the governing majority - agrees with the Government, or at least does not wish it to fall, it has to give the Government all the ways and means to implement its policy by allowing the passing of a bill which the Government precisely considers essential to this policy.

The procedure of making the passing of a bill an issue of confidence in the Government can be implemented during any of the readings of the bill.

2. – Practice

The use of article 49, paragraph 3 of the Constitution has varied since 1958. It was rarely used at the beginning of the Fifth Republic. However certain Governments have had recourse to it on a large scale, because they only commanded a relative majority in the National Assembly (Governments Barre, Rocard, Cresson and Beregovoy for instance). However, this procedure has been used, contrary to its original purpose, to allow the complete examination of a bill on which too many amendments have been tabled. This procedure has thus become the last weapon to overcome obstructionist tactics.

During the XI^th Parliament (1997-2002), the Government did not use this procedure. During the XII^th Parliament (2002-2007), the Government used article 49, paragraph 3 once, to complete the examination of the first reading of the bill on equal opportunities.